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road train and destroyed Plaintiff brougtt action against the railroad con-
pany for damages and recovered. The Court held that the plaintiff's negli.
gence had terminated after his engine had stalled and since .the defendant, If
he had exercised reasonable care. rmwht have aversed the accident, be also
was negigemt. Thus his act was omidered to be the proximate cause of the
damage since he had the "last clear danced of preventing it A similar vw
was held in Green v. Los Angeles Terminal lailrod Co. 143 CaL 31, where
the doctrine of the "last deear dance" was held to apply, notwithstanding the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff; the Court saying. "It applies in cases
where the defendant knowing of plaintiff's danger, and that it is obvious he
cannot extricate himself from it, fails to do something which it is in his
power to do to avoid the injury." Cases in Pennsylvania seem to support the
principal cse. Feudale v. Hines, 271 Pa. 199, a case similar to those above
mentioned held that the doctrine of the 'last dear chance" did not apply. In
Pennsylvania the rule is firmly established that a failure by the driver of a
vehicle to stop, look and listen in a substantial mnner before crossing rail-
road tracks is cotributory negligence which will be a bar to recovery. Ibrig
v. Erie Railroad Co6 210 Pa. M& By a review of other cases it will be sew
that as a general rule the dodtrine of the "last clear chance" is not applied
to cases like the one under oonsideration but rather the rule that if the de-
fendant has been guilty of contributory negligence he cannot recover. Nor-
folk & W. R. Co. v. Wilson, 90 Va. 263; O'brien v. McGlinchy, 68 Me. 552.
The cases in whicb the "last clear dance" doctrine applies seems to be thoe
in which the negligence of plaintiff has ceased before being injured by de-
fendant, which said injury would not have occurred if defendant had exercised
reasonabe care upon seeing the plaintiff in a position of danger from which
he cannot extricate himself.
POWERS--LIFE TENANT WITH POWER TO SELL AND DISPOSE
OF LAND IS NOT ENTITLED TO GIVE IT AWAY.
In Cook v. Higgin, 235 S. W. 80, a recent Missouri case, a testatoes
devise of all his propeny to his wife with power to sell and dispose of as
she saw fit and to execut deeds thereof, with remainders over of any prop-
erty undisposed of upon her death, was held to , eate a life estate in the
wife with power of sale and disposition; and rernaindrs over at her death as
provided in the will. The widow, shortly before her death, convey the farm
of 150 acres by warranty deed to her nephew in conhideration of "one dollar
and other good and valuable co.sideratom" The only other consideration
shown is an agreement between the widow and the grantee that he would live
cc the farm and care for her for the rest of her life. This agreement was
not carried out by the grantee. The court held that the consideration for the
cmveya= of the land was insufficient and that the deed to the grantee was
not a sale and disposition of the land in accordance with the provisom of
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the will (and so not a valid execution of the .power) but in legal effect a
mere gift of the la and k was therefore sot aside in favor of the resi-
duary legatees. It was held that she could only convey the land by deed for
an adequate cosideration and not make a dsposh by gift, testamentary
duibposition or other mode of transfer. A holding to the contrary would have
the effect of enlarging the widow's life estate into a fee simple, which result
would be contrary to the testator's intention in accordance with the construc-
tion put upon the will.
It has been repeatedly held in the State of Missouri that a life tenant
with power of sale and disposal or power to execute deeds, cannot make a
gift of the property or dispose of it by any other method than that expressly
set forth in the will and thereby defeat the remainders over upon his death.
Garland v. Smith, 164 'Mo. 1; Burnet Y. Burnet, 244 Mo. 491; Tallent v. Fitz-
patrick, 253 Mo. 10; Priest Y. McFarand, 262 Mo. 236.
TAXATION OF "CORPORATE SECURITIES".
Section 6 3 18-p. of the Compiled Statutes Annotated Supplement of 1919
provides for the taxation of "everything known as corporate securities." In the
case of the Fidelity Trust Co. v. IL-derer, 276 Fed. S1. the question arose as to
whether car tnut certifif e are included within this act as one form of "or-
porate security." Io deciding this question the court first said that all forms
of securities or investment issued by corporations are taxable. It then went
on to say that while car trust certificates were neither evidences of indebted-
ness nor of shares in corporate assets, yet they are a form of corporate se-
curity within the meaning of that phrase as used in the act of Congress re-
ferred to above. In its opinion the court says that simply because car trust
certificates were not thought of at the time of passing this taxation act and
coosequently not among the enumerated forms of securities, yet as it was the
manifest intent of Congress to include all conceivable forms of corporate
securities, car trust certificates must be 42xed under this act.
TRADE SECRETS AS PROPERTY.
In a recent case which is now under advisement, one of the parties took the
untenable position that trade secrets are not property, but are personal to their
pogsessor and that his rights are extinguished with his death and do not con-
stitute assets in his estate.
No-one could deny that anything that is assignable, that can be con-
veyed by deed, that constitutes assets in bankruptcy, that is a subject of sale,
that may be held in trust, and that constitutes assets in the estate of a de-
cedent, is property in the fullest and mos comprehensive seine of the term.
Trade secrets possess all these attributes. The following are the leading cases
on this subject and conclusively establish the proposition that trade secrets
are property:
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